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ABSTRACT 
Recent studies have proposed that traditional security technology – 
involving pattern-matching algorithms that check predefined 
pattern sets of intrusion signatures – should be replaced with 
sophisticated adaptive approaches that combine machine learning 
and behavioural analytics. However, machine learning is 
performance driven, and the high computational cost is 
incompatible with the limited computing power, memory capacity 
and energy resources of portable IoT-enabled devices. The 
convoluted nature of deep-structured machine learning means that 
such models also lack transparency and interpretability. The 
knowledge obtained by interpretable learners is critical in security 
software design. We therefore propose two novel models featuring 
a common Deep Extraction and Mutual Information Selection 
(DEMISe) element which extracts features using a deep-structured 
stacked autoencoder, prior to feature selection based on the amount 
of mutual information (MI) shared between each feature and the 
class label. An entropy-based tree wrapper is used to optimise the 
feature subsets identified by the DEMISe element, yielding the 
DEMISe with Tree Evaluation and Regression Detection 
(DETEReD) model. This affords ‘white box’ insight, and achieves 
a time to build of 603 seconds, a 99.07% detection rate, and 98.04% 
model accuracy. When tested against AWID, the best-referenced 
intrusion detection dataset, the new models achieved a test error 
comparable to or better than state-of-the-art machine-learning 
models, with a lower computational cost and higher levels of 
transparency and interpretability. 
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1 Introduction 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an expanding network of devices 
that are predicted to become more mainstream as a result of their 
proliferation in the healthcare, retail, manufacturing and 
transportation markets [1,2]. The IoT comprises everyday devices 
with a degree of networked capability such that they provide an 
impression of intelligence [2], but they are neither mobile devices 
nor traditional computers [1]. As the IoT continues to grow, 
concerns have been raised over the potential misuse of IoT 
devices to illicitly obtain sensitive personal information (such as 
location, identity, payment details and health data) or as a means 
to attack far larger interconnected systems [1,2].  
To tackle these security issues, perimeter security comprises 
preventive measures such as firewall, authentication and access 
control. Despite the central role of such measures in computer 
security, recent studies have shown that most computer security 
incidents are caused by insiders, i.e. people who would not be 
blocked by these preventative technologies because they often 
require access with significant privileges to do their daily jobs [3]. 
Prevention, although necessary, is not a complete security 
solution. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) not only complement 
preventive controls as the next line of defence, but also help to 
defend against the various threats to which networks and hosts are 
exposed. This is achieved by the network/host-level detection of 
attacker actions or tools based on misuse or heuristic detection 
techniques [4]. 
Most contemporary IDS techniques are not suitable for the 
IoT because they are not designed to handle the limited computing 
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power, memory capacity and energy resources of portable IoT-
enabled devices. Current IDS platforms involve pattern-matching 
algorithms that check predefined pattern sets consisting of 
intrusion signatures. More importantly, they only detect known 
attacks, so a signature must be created for every attack, and novel 
attacks cannot be detected. Recent studies have proposed that 
traditional security technology should be replaced with more 
sophisticated adaptive approaches that combine machine learning 
and behavioural analytics while minimising the use of computing 
power and energy. 
Machine-learning systems are typically performance driven, 
and most non-parametric and model-free approaches therefore 
place high demands on computational resources to find global 
optima. Designing more accurate machine-learning algorithms to 
satisfy the market needs is therefore likely to increase the 
computational costs and energy demands even further.  
Deep-learning algorithms are becoming more widespread, 
as seen in convolutional neural networks (CNNs) that combine 
feature extraction and classification. Deep-learning methods use 
feature engineering to achieve a better predictive performance 
than is possible using a single neural network model. However, 
these are computationally demanding resources especially when 
dealing with large-scale or highly-dimensional data. For example, 
CNNs gradually extract local features from high-resolution 
feature maps and then combine these features into more abstract 
feature maps of lower resolution [5]. This is realised by 
alternating convolution and subsampling layers. The last few 
layers in the CNN use fully connected multi-layered perceptron-
based neural network classifiers to produce the abstracted results. 
Assuming Q input feature maps and R output feature maps, and a 
feature map size of M × N, the convolutional kernel size is K × L 
and the computation in the convolution layer can be represented in 
a nested-loop description, as shown below.  
 
 
 
The array X contains the input feature maps, and the array Y 
contains the output feature maps, which are initialised to zeros. 
The array W contains the weights in the convolution kernels. The 
computational workload in the convolution layer only is in the 
order of O(R · Q · M · N · K · L), whereas the computational 
workload in the following subsampling layer is in the order of 
O(Q · M · N). At the output of each layer, an activation function is 
applied to each vector in the feature maps to mimic neuron 
activation. 
More importantly, the convoluted and complex nature of 
deep-structured machine learning can make the models difficult to 
                                                             
1Within this research we define lightweight as IoT devices which utilise some of the 
smallest microcontrollers available on the market, for example, the D1000 Intel Quark 
microcontroller with a 32MHz clock speed and 8KB of RAM.  
interrogate and interpret, hence generally described as a ‘black 
box’. In intrusion detection algorithm design, interpretability is a 
critical determinant of the practical utility of the resulting IDS. 
This not only ensures that the model is aligned with the problem 
addressed by the intrusion detection algorithm, but also allows the 
knowledge obtained by the interpretable learners to be used in 
other security software designs. Model interpretability is of 
tremendous importance to confirm that the model is performing 
its task as expected, thus creating trust with end-users. 
Nowadays, there is a greater need to develop new 
lightweight and interpretable machine-learning models to cope 
with future demands that are in line with similar IoT-related 
initiatives. Efficient and interpretable modelling is important for 
cybersecurity, specifically intrusion detection problems that affect 
many industries. Accordingly, we here propose two machine-
learning intrusion detection models for IoT devices which utilise a 
common Deep Extraction and Mutual Information Selection 
(DEMISe) element. Within the DEMISe element of the models, 
additional features are extracted using a two-layer deep-structured 
stacked autoencoder (SAE), and are then combined with the 
original features and ranked according to the amount of mutual 
information (MI) they share with the class label (normal or 
attack), using a MI theoretic feature selection filter. For resource-
constrained IoT devices in which redundant features have already 
been identified, and MI ranking alone is sufficient to achieve an 
acceptable IDS performance, we propose the DEMISe model 
combined with a Radial Basis Function Classifier (DEMISe-
RBFC). However, given that rank-based feature selection filters 
do not utilise machine learning to identify optimal feature subsets 
[6], a solely rank-based feature selection approach might select a 
feature subset that still retains some unnecessary dimensionality. 
Therefore, the proposed DEMISe-RBFC utilises a ‘black box’ 
classifier to afford a level of resilience to this additional 
dimensionality.  
Recognising this limitation, we also propose the DEMISe 
with Tree Evaluation and Regression Detection (DETEReD) 
model, which utilises a C4.8 tree-based wrapper in a novel 
manner to identify optimal feature subsets among the top 10 
features ranked by the MI theoretic filter. As a result of this subset 
optimisation, a lower complexity ‘white box’ logistic regression 
can be applied in the DETEReD model for instance classification, 
thus affording a deeper insight into the model’s learning process. 
In terms of this paper’s contribution, we will: 
 
• Show MI theoretic feature selection can be effective on its 
own, but is best employed as a pre-selection filter prior to 
wrapper-based feature subset selection. 
• Build upon current architectural descriptions [7,8,9] to show 
that a machine-learning IDS has the potential to be 
lightweight enough to be accommodated within an IoT 
device1. 
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• Build upon earlier work [10] to show the utility of features 
extracted using a deep SAE, which in conjunction with 
lightweight MI theoretic feature selection, is able to train a 
model that outperforms those proposed elsewhere [11,12]. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 introduces the DEMISe-RBFC and DETEReD models and 
justifies them in more detail, outlining the three key training 
methods. Section 3 analyses and evaluates the performance of the 
models, and Section 4 concludes our findings and recommends 
some areas of further work. 
2 Methodology 
Based on a selection of the 11 criteria proposed earlier [13], we 
selected the Aegean Wi-Fi Impersonation Attack Detection 
(AWID) dataset containing real traces of 802.11 traffic obtained 
from a dedicated WEP protected Wi-Fi network as the most 
representative dataset for the IoT environment, and thus the most 
appropriate dataset for model training and evaluation. We selected 
the reduced CLS portion of the AWID dataset because it serves as 
a useful starting point for preliminary research [12], and affords a 
baseline against which the DEMISe-RBFC and DETEReD 
models can be compared with the state-of-the-art Deep Feature 
Extraction and Selection (D-FES) method [10], and other methods 
using the same reduced CLS portion [11,12]. We pursued the 
‘divide and conquer’ approach for DEMISe-RBFC and 
DETEReD model development, focusing only on the detection of 
impersonation attacks. Although flooding and injection attack 
signatures are also available within the AWID-CLS dataset, 
impersonation attacks were our focus as Hirte, Honeypot and 
EvilTwin impersonation attacks have previously been identified 
as the most severe threats to a network [12] and have been the 
focus of earlier research [10,11]. As a result, selecting 
impersonation attacks as the focus of our work allowed us to 
directly compare the performance of our model to others, a key 
weakness within the current body of machine-learning-based IoT 
IDS research. During pre-processing, the values for each instance 
within the dataset were normalised between zero and one to 
prevent bias in the machine learner towards features with the 
largest value ranges [14], and the entire dataset was balanced 
50:50 in terms of the normal and impersonation attack instances2. 
 Although a balanced dataset is not representative of a real-
world network environment, balancing sacrifices some accuracy 
in terms of detecting the more prevalent class (in this case the 
normal traffic) in order to achieve greater detection accuracy for 
the minority class (i.e. the attack instances) [14]. Fig. 1 shows the 
high-level architecture of the DEMISe-RBFC model, and Fig. 2 
shows the high-level architecture of the DETEReD model. The 
key elements of both models are now discussed in further detail. 
                                                             
2The balanced training dataset contained 48,522 normal and impersonation attack 
instances, with the testing dataset containing 20,079 normal and impersonation attack 
instances. 
2.1 Deep Structured Stacked Autoencoder 
Based Feature Extraction  
Although features can be extracted by principal component 
analysis (PCA), an autoencoder has a significant advantage 
over PCA in terms of its ability to utilise a non-linear 
activation (or transfer) function such as the sigmoid function 
(1) on an input variable x [14,15]. 
 𝑓(𝑥) = 11 − 𝑒*+  (1) 
 
An autoencoder is an unsupervised greedy learning 
algorithm within artificial neural network (ANN) family, but 
unlike many other ANNs, an autoencoder has an encoder-
decoder architecture that attempts to learn a compressed 
approximation of the training data, such that it can efficiently 
predict the correct output for any given input [15]. 
 
 
Figure. 1:  High-level architecture of the DEMISe-RBFC 
model showing the core DEMISe element for feature 
extraction and selection, the Radial Basis Function Classifier, 
and the pre-processing stages. 
Within an ANN such as an autoencoder, a neuron is a 
computational unit that takes an input x1,x2,…xn, and outputs a 
hypothesis hW,b(x), where the parameters W and b represent the 
weights and biases within the network that the learning algorithm 
adjusts to fit the training data [15]. Fig. 3 shows an autoencoder 
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with only 50 neurons within its encoder layer to represent the 
original input of 154 features. As a result, each neuron within the 
encoder layer can be considered a newly constructed (or 
extracted) feature. Having learnt this compressed representation of 
the data, the decoder layer then attempts to use the learning within 
the encoder layer to reconstruct an output that resembles the 
original input as closely as possible, i.e. hW,b(x) » x. 
Mathematically the autoencoder can be expressed in terms 
of an input vector x being mapped by the encoder to another 
vector z (2), 
 𝑧 = ℎ(./012.3)4𝑊(./012.3)𝑥 + 𝑏(./012.3)8 (2) 
 
prior to the decoder layer attempting to map the vector z 
back to an estimate of the original input vector 𝑥9 (3). 
 𝑥9 = ℎ(2.012.3)4𝑊(2.012.3)𝑧 + 𝑏(2.012.3)8 (3) 
 
 
Figure. 2:  High-level architecture of the DETEReD model 
showing the core DEMISe element for feature extraction and 
selection, the C4.8 tree wrapper, the logistic regression, and 
the pre-processing stages. 
The autoencoder achieves mapping by backpropagation, 
whereby from the outset of training hW,b(x) is set to » x, thus 
forcing the autoencoder to learn a function that satisfies this 
constraint [15]. However, because autoencoders are greedy 
algorithms, they have the potential to discard features too early 
that could still be needed to accurately determine the correct target 
class for a given instance [10,16]. By learning a compressed 
representation of the feature space, the autoencoder algorithm 
assumes that achieving locally optimised weights and biases at 
each neuron will deliver the best overall performance [17]. To 
overcome this drawback, we used a stacked autoencoder (SAE) 
within Matlab for feature extraction. A SAE is a deep-learning 
implementation of an autoencoder, in which the learning achieved 
by the encoder layer of the first autoencoder is used to train the 
second autoencoder and so on. As a result, the SAE architecture 
allows the number of hidden neurons within the encoder layer to 
be gradually refined, thus reducing the greediness of the algorithm 
during its search (Fig. 4). 
Furthermore, to construct and extract useful features from 
the SAE, sparsity must be encouraged within each layer. To 
achieve this, a cost function is included to penalise any neuron 
which activates more frequently than the average number of 
activations across all of the neurons within the network [15]. If m 
is the number of training instances (in this case 48,522), 𝑎;(./012.3) is the activation of the jth neuron within the 
autoencoder’s encoder layer, and the average number of 
activations of the jth neuron across the training set is r<= , where r<=  
is described as shown below (4). 𝜌9; = 	 1𝑚AB𝑎;(./012.3)4𝑥(C)8DECFG   (4) 
 
 
Figure. 3:  Autoencoder architecture, where X is an input 
feature, N is a neuron within the encoder layer, and D is a 
neuron within the decoder layer. 
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Figure. 4:  Stacked autoencoder architecture, where N1 is a 
neuron within the first autoencoder’s encoder layer, N2 is a 
neuron within the second autoencoder’s encoder layer, and D 
is a neuron within the decoder layer. 
As a result, a sparsely trained autoencoder aims to satisfy 
the constraint that r<= = 	𝜌, where r is known as the sparsity 
parameter. For our SAE, the commonly used Kullback-Leibler 
(KL) divergence was used as the sparsity penalty function 
(WHIJ3HCKL) because it takes the value of zero when r<= = 	𝜌 as 
shown below (5). 
 ΩHIJ3HCKL = 		 A 𝜌 log Q𝜌𝜌9CR + (1S.T31/H(UVWXYZ[)CFG− 𝜌) log Q1 − 𝜌1 − 𝜌9CR 
 
(5) 
 
For the DEMISe element of the model, we selected a SAE 
architecture of 154:100:50, which was previously shown to be 
effective for the generation of a compressed representation of the 
same reduced CLS AWID dataset [10]. Therefore, the first 
encoder layer learns a 100-neuron representation of the original 
154 features, from which the second encoder layer learns a 50-
neuron representation.  
2.2 Mutual Information Theoretic Feature 
Selection 
Within the common DEMISe element of the DEMISe-RBFC and 
DETEReD models, the 154 original and 50 newly extracted 
features are ranked and filtered based upon the amount of MI they 
share with the class label. Although filter methods for feature 
selection can deliver a sub-optional subset of features for 
classifier training [18], they present the most lightweight option 
for feature selection within an already resource-constrained IoT 
device. The DEMISe-RBFC model therefore employs a ‘black 
box’ Radial Basis Classifier to overcome the adverse effect of 
potentially suboptimal feature subsets being used for model 
training. To afford greater insight into the learning process, the 
DETEReD model also uses a C4.8 tree wrapper alongside the MI 
theoretic filter to optimise the feature subset. Although wrapper 
methods are more computationally expensive than filter methods 
because they use a iterative-learning-process to identify optimal 
feature subsets [18], the computational complexity of the wrapper 
is reduced because only the 10 features sharing the greatest 
amount of MI with the class label are considered, rather than all 
204 (154 original plus 50 extracted features). Given that the MI 
theoretic filter will already have identified deterministic features 
of the class label, the lightweight optimisation afforded by the 
wrapper enables the use of a lower-complexity ‘white box’ 
logistic regression algorithm for instance classification, thereby 
providing additional valuable insight for the software security 
expert. 
Although embedded methods that undertake feature 
selection as part of the learning process [6] were also considered 
for the feature selection element of the model, they are unable to 
afford the same level of insight in terms of feature importance and 
are slower and therefore more computationally expensive than 
filter-based methods [18].  
Filter-based methods perform feature selection 
independently of the machine learner, thus, the feature selection 
uses heuristics centred on the inherent properties of the data to 
score and rank features [6]. Although many different measures 
and techniques are cited in the IDS literature for feature selection 
filters, we used MI in our model as the measure to score and rank 
the 204 features because promising results have been achieved by 
others using this approach [19,20,21]. MI was proposed by 
Shannon [22] as part of his information theory, which included 
the concept of entropy: the idea that random signals such as 
speech have an irreducible complexity, below which no further 
compression is possible [23]. The entropy H of a random variable 
x with a probability mass function p(x) can therefore be defined as 
shown below (6): 
 𝐻(𝑥) = 	−A𝑝(𝑥) log^ 𝑝(𝑥)+∈`  (6) 
 
where 𝑋 is a set of all possible outcomes of 𝑥.  
The concept of entropy gives rise to: i) conditional entropy 
 𝐻(𝑥|𝑦) = 	−A A 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)L∈e log^[𝑝(𝑥|𝑦)]+∈`  (7) 
 
where the entropy H of a random variable x is conditional upon 
the knowledge of another random variable y; and ii) mutual 
information 
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𝐼(𝑥; 𝑦) = 	∑ 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦) log^ I(+,L)I(+)I(L) = 𝐻(𝑥) −+,L	𝐻(𝑥|𝑦),   (8) 
 
denoting the amount of information gained about y as a result of 
knowing x [18,22]. In terms of our MI theoretic feature selection 
filter, the random variables x and y can be flexibly used to 
represent features and class labels. For example, x can be used to 
denote a feature within the dataset, and y can be invoked to denote 
as a class label, i.e., how likely the machine learner is to correctly 
predict the class label for any given instance as a result of learning 
a given feature.  
Computing the expressions (6)–(8) requires knowledge of 
probability measures 𝑝(𝑥), 𝑝(𝑦) and 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦). Since these 
quantities are frequently unknown a priori for any given datasets, 
we invoke a widely-used histogram-based approach [26–28] to 
estimate the probability distribution. Generally histogramming is 
known to introduce estimation bias due to sensitivity to bin size 
[23,26–29]. We follow the procedures of discretization via 
supervised binning [30,31] to minimise this bias and obtain more 
accurate estimation of MI values.  
Rank-based MI theoretic feature selection is inherently 
based on the assumption that classifier performance is linked to 
the amount of MI shared between the class label and a feature, i.e. 
the greater the number of high-ranking features selected for 
classifier training, the better the classifiers perform in terms of 
correctly identifying the class label for any given instance. 
However, this approach ignores the potential for more optimal 
subsets to exist, comprising features that are not sequentially 
ranked in terms of their MI values. In other words, the DEMISe 
element of the model assumes that features sequentially ranked 
1,2,3,4,5 will train a better performing classifier than (for 
example) features ranked 1,3,7,32,91. In practice this is likely 
invalid due to the false assumption that each feature contains 
different and complementary information about the class label. 
Nevertheless, for the ultra-lightweight DEMISe-RBFC model, this 
approach should still identify features that can be used to train an 
IoT IDS model that achieves a ‘good enough’ detection 
performance within highly resource-constrained devices. On the 
other hand, the DETEReD model addresses the weak assumption 
made by the DEMISe element’s MI theoretic feature selection by 
including the C4.8 tree wrapper. 
A review of the IDS literature indicates that a feature 
selection filter as a pre-selection stage prior to wrapper subset 
optimisation is a novel approach to reduce dimensionality within 
resource-constrained devices. Although various wrapper 
algorithms including ANNs and support vector machines (SVMs) 
were considered for the DETEReD model, the C4.8 was selected 
because of it is less complex and thus has a lower impact on 
computational resources. Furthermore, the DEMISe element 
within the DETEReD model will already have identified 
potentially important features, so the additional complexity 
associated with SVMs and ANNs is unnecessarily resource-
intensive. For DEMISe-RBFC model training, we selected up to 
20 of the highest-ranking features in terms of the MI they share 
with the class label, which is 10% of all features. The state-of-the-
art D-FES method which also uses deep feature extraction and 
selection, achieves strong detection performance with a similar 
number of selected features [10]. However, for the C4.8 wrapper 
in the DETEReD model, we only seek to identify optimal subsets 
among the top 10 features identified by the DEMISe element to 
minimise the time to build and the resource burden.  
2.3 White Box and Black Box Classification 
For the linear radial basis function approximation within the 
DEMISe-RBFC model, the Radial Basis Function Classifier 
(RBFC) was selected because, unlike other types of ANN, a radial 
basis function network can learn neuron widths and centres 
independently of the weights [14], offering advantages in terms of 
computational complexity (Fig. 5). Furthermore, an RBFC can 
also express non-linear relationships, which simpler algorithms 
such as the C4.8 and logistic regression cannot. This is 
particularly important given the aforementioned potential failure 
of the solely rank-based MI theoretic feature selection approach 
(adopted within the DEMISe-RBFC model) to identify optimal 
feature subsets. As a result, a higher complexity classifier such as 
the RBFC is required to ensure that model performance is not 
degraded by the presence of additional noise and outliers within 
the data. The RBFC achieves lower complexity than SVMs and 
other ANNs by generalising local representations i.e. a radial 
basis function network represents a ‘prototype’ of the training 
data from which the model draws generalised rules to describe the 
class labels [14].  
 
Figure. 5:  The Radial Basis Function Classifier architecture, 
where X is a top 20 ranked feature based on the amount of MI 
it shares with the class label, and Y is the class prediction 
made by the radial basis function network. 
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For the implementation, the initial centres for the two 
Gaussian radial basis functions were found using simple k-means 
clustering, whereas the weights were found using an 
approximation of the logistic function, thereby improving overall 
performance. For the interpretable regression in the DETEReD 
model, the implementation of a logistic regression in which ridge 
estimators improve the parameter estimates and diminish the error 
made by further predictions [24].  
3 Evaluation and Analysis 
For all aspects of DEMISe-RBFC and DETEReD model training 
and testing, we used a workstation running a Unix-based OS with 
a 3.1 GHz Intel Core i7 CPU and 8 Gb of RAM. In terms of the 
model evaluation metrics, we elected to use the standard measures 
of detection accuracy (Acc) (9), detection rate (DR), which is the 
ratio of the correctly detected attacks to the total number of 
attacks (10), precision, which measures the number of correctly 
identified attacks (11), false alarm rate (FAR), which is the ratio 
of the number of normal instances misclassified as attacks against 
the total number of normal instances (12), false negative rate 
(FNR), which represents the number of undetected attacks (13), 
the harmonic mean between precision and DR (F1) (14), and the 
Matthews correlation coefficient (Mcc), which is the coefficient 
between detected and observed behaviours [10] (15). We also 
measured the CPU time (second) to build for the model because it 
indicates the computational burden associated with model 
training. 
 𝐴𝑐𝑐 = 	 𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 (9) 
 𝐷𝑅(𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙) = 	 𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 (10) 
 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 (11) 
 𝐹𝐴𝑅 =	 𝐹𝑃𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 (12) 
 𝐹𝑁𝑅 =	 𝐹𝑁𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃 (13) 
 𝐹G =	 2𝑇𝑃2𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 (14) 
 𝑀𝑐𝑐=	 (𝑇𝑃 ∗ 𝑇𝑁) − (𝐹𝑃 ∗ 𝐹𝑁)|(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃)(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)(𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃)(𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁) 
(15) 
 
 
Table I:  Top 20 features based on mutual information values 
Features in order of 
decreasing MI value 
8, 82, 4, 38, 157, 162, 168, 160, 188, 161, 
199, 176, 159, 191, 182, 186, 195, 156, 
158, 165 
3.1 Mutual Information Theoretic Feature 
Selection 
Having extracted the 50 additional features using the deep 
structured SAE, the continuous variables were discretised using 
supervised entropy-based discretisation, with the MI between each 
of the 204 features and the class label calculated as shown above 
(8). Entropy-based discretisation was applied because it affords a 
degree of efficiency within the model given that the entropy of 
each feature is also required to calculate MI. The top 20 features 
are described in Table I in terms of the MI they share with the 
class label identified by the MI theoretic feature selection filter 
within the DEMISe element of both models. 
Of the 204 features ranked by the model, only 83 had a MI 
value > 0, suggesting that 121 features were statistically 
independent of the class label, and thus irrelevant to the 
identification of an impersonation attack within the reduced CLS 
portion of the AWID dataset. This is not an unreasonable 
discovery, given that not all features within a dataset are 
important for attack detection [21]. However, this finding suggests 
that even low-complexity MI theoretic feature selection filters are 
able to reduce dimensionality within modern complex network 
datasets such as AWID. 
Table II:  Optimal number of high-ranking features for 
different classifiers 
The time to build (TTB) for all models includes the 293 s required by the deep-
structured SAE. Abbreviations not used in main text: logistic regression (LR), 
multilayer perceptron (MLP), random forest (RF). 
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Figure. 6:  DEMISe-RBFC model performance when trained 
with the top n selected features, where 20 ³ n £ 1. The 
performance of the DEMISe-RBFC model cannot be predicted 
in advance of training based on the MI shared between each 
feature and the class label. 
3.2 DEMISe-RBFC 
For the first round of training and testing, the DEMISe-RBFC 
model was trained using all of the top 20 features shown in Table 
I, and then for each subsequent round the number of selected 
features was reduced by one, with the lowest ranking feature 
being removed from the training subset each time. We took this 
approach in order to test the hypothesis that the classifier 
performance could be predicted using MI ranking alone, whereby 
the greater the number of high-ranking features used for training, 
the stronger the model’s detection performance. Although our 
results indicated that training the model’s RBFC with the top 
seven features identified by rank-based MI theoretic feature 
selection met the objective of achieving a ‘good enough’ detection 
performance (Fig. 6), it was not possible to predict this optimal 
number of high-ranking features in advance.  
This conclusion was considered justified because several 
linear and non-linear classifiers were also tested in lieu of the 
RBFC to ensure the observed behaviour could not be attributed to 
the RBFC algorithm. As shown in Table II, the top seven features 
did not prove to be an optimal combination for any of the 
alternative classifiers. However, MI theoretic feature selection 
yielded a better-performing model than training using all 204 
features and was therefore considered effective (Table III). 
Furthermore, because the optimal subset comprising the top seven 
features included the extracted features 157, 162 and 168, the 
suitability of the deep structured SAE for feature extraction within 
the DEMISe-RBFC model was also confirmed. 
 
 
Table III:  Mutual information theoretic feature selection 
versus no feature selection  
 
The time to build (TTB) for all models includes the 293 s required by the deep-
structured SAE. 
3.3 DETEReD 
Having identified the top 20 features within the DEMISe element 
of the model (Table I), the C4.8 wrapper considered only the top 
10 for subset optimisation, i.e. features 8, 82, 4, 38, 157, 162, 168, 
160, 188 and 161. Among these features, the wrapper identified 
an optimal subset comprising features 4, 8, 82, 160 and 168. 
Because this subset also included extracted features, the suitability 
of the deep structured SAE for feature extraction within the 
DETEReD model was confirmed. 
When trained with this five-feature subset, logistic 
regression achieved the performance shown in Table IV. As 
above, this performance was compared against other classifiers to 
validate the effectiveness of the proposed DETEReD model. 
Accordingly, we found that logistic regression was the best-
performing classifier for the DETEReD model. 
Table IV:  DETEReD model performance with different 
classifiers 
The CPU time to build (TTB) for all models includes the 293 s required by the deep-
structured SAE and the 309 s required by the C4.8 wrapper. Abbreviations not used in 
main text: logistic regression (LR), multilayer perceptron (MLP), random forest (RF). 
3.4 Comparison Against Baselines 
Having trained and tested the DEMISe-RBFC and DETEReD 
models, their suitability was assessed by comparing their 
performance against other published machine-learning-based IDS 
solutions. For the purposes of this comparison, we selected the D-
FES model because it represents the current state-of-the-art in 
terms of combining feature extraction and selection techniques 
within an machine-learning-based IDS [10], as well as two models 
previously used to detect impersonation attacks within the reduced 
CLS portion of the AWID dataset [11,12]. The performance of the 
DEMISe-RBFC and DETEReD models is compared against the 
D-FES model in Table V, and against the models previously 
tested against the CLS portion of the AWID in Table VI. 
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Table V:  DETEReD and DEMISe-RBFC vs D-FES models 
 
D-FES data from [10]. TTB = CPU time to build. 
 
Given that our aim was to develop a lightweight machine-
learning-based IDS solution suitable for the IoT environment, it 
would be unreasonable to expect the DEMISe-RBFC and 
DETEReD models to match the performance of the D-FES 
wrapper methods which consider all 204 features, in contrast to 
the vastly reduced subset considered by the DETEReD model, and 
the solely filter-based method used by the DEMISe-RBFC model. 
Nevertheless, Table V shows that DEMISe-RBFC and DETEReD 
compared well against the D-FES wrapper methods, and 
outperform it when using the DR and F1 classifiers. In terms of 
the CPU time to build, the DETEReD model was 52.29% quicker 
than the fastest D-FES-Corr filter-based method, whereas the 
DEMISe-RBFC model was 76.14% quicker. The lightweight 
nature of the DEMISe-RBFC and DETEReD models was further 
demonstrated by comparison to the best-performing D-FES-SVM, 
with the DETEReD model achieving a 95.01% faster time to 
build. The DEMISe-RBFC and DETEReD models also 
outperformed the earlier models tested on the same dataset [11,12] 
when using the Acc, DR and FAR classifiers, and although these 
previous studies did not provide data for F1 and Mcc, the available 
metrics suggest that the DEMISe-RBFC and DETEReD models 
would also outperform the earlier models using these classifiers. 
Accordingly, we suggest that the inclusion of deep feature 
extraction in the DEMISe-RBFC and DETEReD models provides 
an advantage in terms of impersonation attack detection within the 
AWID dataset. 
Table VI:  DETERED and DEMISE-RBFC versus Models 
previously tested against the CLS portion of the AWID 
dataset [11,12] 
 
NRA = No results available. 
3.5 Estimating Resource Requirements 
Having demonstrated that the DEMISe-RBFC and DETEReD 
models compete well against the contemporary models in the 
wider IDS literature, we now consider the resource requirements 
of these two models in order to determine their suitability for IoT 
devices. 
To estimate the resource requirements of these two models, 
the 32-bit IEEE 754 binary floating-point standard was selected 
because the representative D1000, D2000 and C1000 Intel Quark 
microcontrollers designed for use within IoT devices utilise a 32-
bit architecture [25]. We used this binary notation standard to 
estimate the resource requirements of both models by expressing 
the coefficients within the DETEReD model’s logistic regression 
and the DEMISe-RBFC radial basis function’s unit centres, bias 
weights, and output weights. Based on these estimates, Table VII 
shows that despite the longer CPU time to build, the white-box 
DETEReD model requires an estimated 24 bytes of memory to 
capture the five weights and one intercept learnt by the logistic 
regression, whereas the black-box DEMISe-RBFC model requires 
84 bytes to capture its more-complex 21 learnt parameters. 
Based on the estimated resource requirements in Table VII 
and the specification for even the smallest D1000 Intel Quark 
microcontroller, the parameters learnt by the DEMISe-RBFC and 
DETEReD models could potentially be accommodated within the 
available non-volatile memory (32 Kb instruction, 4 Kb data) of 
the microcontroller [25], thus confirming that the DEMISe-RBFC 
and DETEReD models are suitable for an machine-learning-based 
IoT IDS. 
Table VII:  Estimated resource requirements for DETEReD 
and DEMISe-RBFC  
 
4 Conclusion and Future Work 
We built upon earlier architectural descriptions [7,8,9] to propose 
two lightweight and accurate models for a machine-learning-
based IDS with potential suitability for the resource-constrained 
and dynamic IoT environment. We found that although MI 
theoretic feature selection is an effective strategy to identify 
features that are important for the correct classification of any 
given instance, it is best employed in a novel manner as a pre-
selection stage prior to wrapper subset evaluation. The 
performance of a classifier could not be predicted based on the MI 
values for each feature alone, so the optimisation of the DEMISe-
RBFC model could prove challenging if re-training were required 
using an unfamiliar dataset, because it may not be valid to assume 
that the top seven features will always train the best performing 
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model. The DETEReD model overcomes this issue by the novel 
application of a C4.8 wrapper which only considers the top 10 
features identified by the MI theoretic filter, thereby reducing the 
computational complexity caused by the wrapper needing to 
consider subsets within all 204 features. The DETEReD model 
can therefore use a simpler classifier such as logistic regression, 
and thus delivers white box insight into the model’s learning 
process. 
The DEMISe-RBFC and DETEReD models also 
demonstrate the utility of deep structured feature extraction using 
a stacked autoencoder, whereby both models use extracted 
features during learning and outperform earlier models [11,12] by 
including this deep feature extraction stage. 
In terms of the state-of-the-art in the wider machine-
learning-based IDS literature, we have shown that our proposed 
DEMISe-RBFC and DETEReD IoT IDS models also outperform 
D-FES filter methods [10], achieving a 76.14% and 52.29% faster 
time to build than even the fastest D-FES-Corr method when 
using the DR and F1 classifiers, respectively. In addition to the 
lower computational cost associated with training the DEMISe-
RBFC and DETEReD models, we also showed that the learning 
achieved by the models could be accommodated within even the 
most resource-constrained devices, requiring just 84 and 24 bytes 
of storage, respectively. 
Finally, in terms of future work, we intend to investigate the 
ability of the DEMISe-RBFC and DETEReD models to detect 
other types of attack that are likely to occur within an IoT 
network, and demonstrate the lightweight nature of the algorithm 
by deploying it within a resource constrained device (e.g. 
Raspberry Pi). 
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